NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge

DIVISION II

WILLIE LEE JACK

APPELLANT

v.

POULAN WEED EATER

APPELLEE

CA 00-142

AUGUST 29, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E811371]

AFFIRMED

ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge

Willie Lee Jack appeals from the Workers' Compensation Commission's order finding that he failed to prove that he sustained a compensable back injury while employed by Poulan Weed Eater. Jack argues that the Commission erred in finding that he failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm.

Jack claimed that he suffered a compensable injury to his back on August 25, 1998, while cleaning up after putting rubber handles on Poulan Weed Eaters. Jack sought payment of his medical expenses and temporary and total disability benefits. Poulan Weed Eater controverted the claim and argued that Jack's injury was unrelated to his employment with Poulan.

At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Jack testified that he had been bending over to pick up debris from the floor at the end of the work day and, when he got half-way up, something "just snapped" across the lower part of his back. Jack testified that he did not immediately report the incident because he thought it would go away but that he reported the back pain the next morning and was assigned to an easier job. He stated that his back pain continued throughout the day such that he asked a co-worker who commuted with him to drive his van home that evening. Jack was in pain the next morning, and he tried to see both Dr. Finley, a doctor on Poulan's insurance list, and Dr. John Nix, his family doctor. After Jack left the doctors' offices, he had a seizure while sitting in his car. Jack was taken by ambulance to the Springhill Medical Center Emergency Room and, upon release, his wife took him to the Wadley Regional Medical Center Emergency Room. Medical records from both hospitals indicated that Jack stated he had had a seizure and he had back pain.

On August 31, 1998, Dr. Finley examined Jack, declined to treat him, and recommended that he see his personal physician. On September 2, 1998, Jack saw Dr. Nix who noted that Jack complained of back and left groin pain. Based on a subsequent MRI, Dr. Nix diagnosed Jack with back pain and L4-L5 disease. Dr. Jeffery DeHaan saw Jack on January 12, 1998, and diagnosed him with multi-level degenerative disk problems, without neurological impingement or encroachment. Dr. DeHann recommended physical therapy and anti-inflammatory medication. At the April 6, 1999, hearing, Jack testified that he had not returned to work since the date of his alleged injury.

The ALJ found that Jack had failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that he failed to produce medical evidence supported by objective findings establishing his alleged injury. On appeal, the Commission found that Jack did establish his injury by objective findings, but that he failed to prove that his injury arose out of his employment.

The standard of review in workers' compensation cases is well settled. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Geo Specialty, supra.

Jack argues that the Commission erred in finding that he failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. In order to establish compensability of an injury, a claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, among other things, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9- 102(5)(A)(i)(1) (Supp. 1997). He must also prove that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i).

Jack argues that his testimony established that he suffered a compensable injury. At the hearing, Jack testified that he reported his injury to his supervisor, John Kieser, the day following the incident. However, Kieser testified that Jack did not tell him he was injured, and he assigned Jack to a different job that day because Jack instead told him he was "wore out" and "needed something a little bit easier." Jack also testified that he attempted to discuss the matter with Carol Kissman, Poulen's Workers' Compensation and Benefits Manager, but that she was unavailable. Jack claimed that when he finally met with Kissman on September 8, 1998, she refused to give him workers' compensation forms, and he had to get the forms from the Commission. Kissman admitted that she did not provide Jack with the forms, but said she told him that the company would need tofirst conduct an investigation.

Here, the testimony before the Commission regarding Jack's injury was from Jack and his supervisor, Kieser. None of Jack's co-workers testified to corroborate his testimony that he was hurt at work or that he was unable to drive home the next day. In making its findings, the Commission accorded "significant weight" to Kieser's testimony and found that Jack failed to establish that "he did, in fact, experience a bending incident on August 25, 1998, at work which caused his back problems." It is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc., 63 Ark. App. 260, 977 S.W.2d 5 (1998). If the evidence is conflicting, as it is here, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. University of Arkansas Medical Sciences v. Hart, 60 Ark. App. 13, 958 S.W.2d 546 (1997). The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Id. Once the Commission has made its decision on issues of credibility, the appellate court is bound by that decision. Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc., supra. Jack also argues that the medical records establish that he suffered a compensable injury. He argues that both Dr. Nix and Dr. DeHaan, on their completed "Physician's Workers' Compensation Questionnaires" concluded that his back injury was a result of a work-related activity. In regard to the medical evidence, the Commission found that Jack satisfied the requirement that his injury be established by objective findings. However, it noted that the history Jack provided to his doctors contained inconsistencies as compared to his hearing testimony and that Jack provided a number of alternative theories as to exactly how and when his back pain began. Therefore, it found that Jack failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he sustained the injury in a bending incident at work.

In support of his argument for reversal, Jack relies upon two cases in which this court reversed the Commission's findings that the claimant's injury did not arise out of his employment. However, both cases are readily distinguishable. In Lloyd v. United Parcel Service, 69 Ark. App. 92, 9 S.W.3d 564 (2000), involving a claim for carpal tunnel syndrome, there was no evidence that the claimant's injury was caused by something other than her employment, and two co-workers testified on the claimant's behalf and corroborated her assertions. In Tucker v. Roberts-McNutt, 69 Ark. App. 150, 12 S.W.3d 640 (2000), the claimant told his supervisor he was going to the doctor following the accident, saw the doctor on the date the injury occurred, and told the doctor that he was just injured at work. Although Jack did attempt to see a doctor the day of the alleged injury, it was only after he went to the emergency room following a seizure two days later that the medical reports note back pain.

The Commission found that Jack was not a credible witness and found that he did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sustained an injury arising out his employment with Poulan. This court must give deference to the Commission on issues of credibility; moreover, Jack provided no witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Consequently, we conclude that the Commission's findings and decision are supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Bird and Baker, JJ., agree.