NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

GREGORY F. HARRIS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR00-1030

August 29, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

[NO. CR 99-3009]

HON. DAVID BOGARD,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant was charged with criminal mischief in the first degree for purposefully causing $500 or more worth of damage to an automobile that belonged to the Gilliams. Prior to trial, appellant filed two pro se motions to dismiss his attorney. Both motions were denied by the trial court. Appellant was tried by a jury, convicted of criminal mischief in the first degree, and sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant filed two pro se post-trial motions for a new trial that were denied. This appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict, in denying his pretrial motions to dismiss his attorney, and in denying his post-trial motions for a new trial. We affirm.

We first address appellant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only the evidence that supports the verdict, and affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Rose v. State, 72 Ark. App. 175, 35 S.W.3d 365 (2000). Evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is substantial if it is of sufficient force that it would compel a conclusion one way or the other without recourse to speculation and conjecture. Id.

In the present case, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he caused at least $500 worth of damage to the Gilliams' automobile. However, there was evidence that the car was only three years old and in perfect shape before appellant struck it repeatedly with a tire tool. The photos that the jury saw show that almost all of the glass on the car was broken and that there was significant damage to two or three body panels. Finally, the Gilliams testified that they paid an insurance deductible of $500 to have the car repaired. We hold that there was substantial evidence that appellant caused $500 worth of damage to the car.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motions to dismiss his attorney. Appellant filed one of these motions ten days before trial and another on the day of trial. He did not ask to represent himself, only that his attorney be dismissed. The supreme court has stated that a last-minute change in attorney may require a continuance, see Anthony v. State, 339 Ark. 20, 2 S.W.3d 780 (1999), and that would certainly be so in the present case, where the matter was not brought to the trial court's attention until the morning of trial. See Leggins v. State, 271 Ark. 616, 609 S.W.2d 76 (1980) (request for a change of attorney made two weeks prior to trial treated as a motionfor continuance). The right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the trial court's inherent power to command an orderly, efficient, and effective administration of justice. Id. Whether or not to grant a continuance for the defendant to change attorneys is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates an abuse of that discretion. Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 906 S.W.2d 310 (1995).

In considering whether to grant such a continuance, relevant factors include the reason for the change, whether other counsel has been identified, whether the defendant has been diligent in seeking the change, and whether denial is likely to result in prejudice to the defendant. Leggins v. State, supra. In the present case, appellant's reasons for the requested change were nebulous and directed more at whether his attorney liked him personally than at her competence to defend him; no substitute counsel had been identified; and there was no showing that appellant could not have requested the change sooner. Under these circumstances, we hold that appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions to dismiss counsel.

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions for a new trial. However, neither of these motions were mentioned in appellant's notices of appeal, and a notice of appeal must designate the judgment or order appealed from. Ark. R. App. P. - Crim. 2(a)(4). A notice of appeal must be judged by what it recites and not what it was intended to recite; it must state the order appealed from with specificity, and orders not mentioned in it are not properly before the appellate court. Daniel v. State, 64 Ark. App.98, 983 S.W.2d 146 (1998); Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Shipman, 25 Ark. App. 247, 756 S.W.2d 930 (1988). Consequently, we are unable to address appellant's arguments relating to the denial of his motions for a new trial.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree.