DIVISION III

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE

CA00-1217

June 20, 2001

ERIN K. SWEENEY AN APPEAL FROM ARKANSAS

APPELLANT WORKERS' COMPENSATION

COMMISSION [E705113, E713328 and

E713329]

V.

CEDAR AMERICA

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Erin Sweeney appeals a decision by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that found she failed her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any mental problems she experienced were caused by a compensable physical injury.1 The Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

Appellant began working for Cedar America in February 1996. Her initial job duties involved packing cedar blocks, and she later sanded and buffed cedar blocks. In the latter part of 1996, appellant developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her upper left extremity, and required a carpal tunnel release. Appellee accepted the injury as compensable and paid related benefits. Following a brief period of recovery, appellant returned to work and performed the same duties. She continued to work for appellee until October 1997.

After appellant was diagnosed with carpal tunnel, she developed a rash on her arms and shins, which she attributed to cedar dust permeating under her wrist bandages. Appellee's safety director, Jane Reedy, testified that cedar is classified as an irritant. Reedy also testified that she observed sores with yellow pus and redness on appellant's arms and that she had never seen anything like it.

On November 4, 1996, appellant was examined by physicians at Calico Rock Medical Group for her rash and diagnosed with an anxiety neurosis. The medical records indicate that she returned for treatment periodically and told the physicians on more than one occasion her opinion that the rash was caused by exposure to cedar dust. However, the physicians who treated appellant consistently diagnosed her condition as an anxiety neurosisand referred her to a dermatologist. In a report dated February 27, 1997, one physician noted that appellant's skin condition was "much improved." However, when appellant returned for a follow-up visit on March 17, 1997, and complained about the skin condition, the physician's note indicates that the condition was "self-induced."

Dr. James Moneypenny conducted a psychological evaluation of appellant and diagnosed her with marked and pervasive symptoms of emotional distress stemming from injuries and harassment that she experienced while working for appellee. He opined that within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, appellant's psychological problems were causally connected to physical injuries she sustained in appellee's employ.

Appellant testified that as a result of her skin condition, she experienced mental problems. She testified that her co-workers frequently discussed sex and that she was subjected to behavior that she described as sexual harassment. Appellant relayed that her skin condition was embarrassing and that every time she went to the restroom, the employees would spray disinfectant because they thought she was contagious. She testified that the company made her obtain notes from a physician on two separate occasions to verify that she was not contagious. Also, two co-workers called her at home and asked her about crabs, which made her feel humiliated, ashamed, and embarrassed. After appellant reported her co-worker's behavior to appellee, she was transferred to another shift. However, at the time of trial, appellant testified that she was really ashamed and embarrassed to go to public places, that she would not go to grocery stores, and that she did not get out where a lot of people were because she was a leper.

After hearing testimony and reviewing the record, including medical records and other evidence, the administrative law judge found, among other things, that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any mental problems she was experiencing were caused by a physical injury. Following a de novo review and without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the administrative law judge. Appellant now appeals the portion of the Commission's decision that found that her mental problems were not caused by a physical injury.

Standard of Review

When considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission's conclusion, we review all evidence and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable toward the Commission's findings. See Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 335 Ark. 356, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998). Findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the Commission are affirmed when supported by substantial evidence. See id., 981 S.W.2d 91. Substantial evidence is said to exist when reasonable minds, viewing the same evidence as presented to the Commission, could reach the same conclusion as the Commission. See id., 981 S.W.2d 91. The critical factor is not whether we may have reached a different conclusion or whether the evidence supports a contrary finding. See Barnett v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Ark. App. 265, 970 S.W.2d 319 (1998). Rather, the issue is whether reasonable minds could arrive at the Commission's conclusion. See id. at 268, 970 S.W.2d 319. When this occurs, we affirm. See id., 970 S.W.2d 319.

Analysis

A compensable injury is one that is the result of 1) an accidental injury that causes internal or external physical harm to the body, or 2) an injury that causes external or internal harm to the body and that arose out of and in the course of an individual's employment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A) (Repl. 1996). In order for a mental illness or injury to be considered a compensable injury, the mental illness or injury must be caused by a physical injury to the employee's body, unless the employee is a victim of a violent crime. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113(a)(1) (Repl. 1996). Additionally, the mental illness or injury must be diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the diagnosis must meet the most recent issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See id. We have interpreted section 11-9-113 as requiring a physical injury to precede and cause the mental injury in order for the mental injury to be considered compensable. See The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 329 Ark. 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997).

Thus, based on Smith, supra, the Commission in the present matter had to initially determine whether appellant met her burden of proving that she sustained a compensable physical injury that caused her mental illness. At the hearing, appellant discussed at length her belief that she experienced mental problems as a result of her skin condition. Yet, appellant does not appeal the Commission's finding that she failed her burden of proving that her dermatitis was a compensable injury. Nor does she challenge the Commission's findings that she failed to prove 1) that she was suffering from left extremity complaints that were causally related to her employment, or 2) that her left carpal tunnel problem had resolved.

Appellant appears to argue that because she sustained a compensable left carpal tunnel injury, which was resolved at the time of the hearing, she substantiated her claim that her mental injury was caused by a physical injury. Stated differently, appellant seems to embrace the theory that "any injury will do" to establish causation between a physical injury and a mental injury. Appellant's argument is unavailing because it discounts the requirement presented in section 11-9-113, i.e., that she demonstrate the existence of a compensable physical injury that caused the mental illness or injury.

While the parties agree that appellant's carpal tunnel injury was compensable, nothing in the record indicates that appellant's carpal tunnel injury caused her mental injury, other than her bare allegation that the "compensable injury led to the harassment and the problems that she had at work thereby causing her mental injury." Instead, the record reveals that appellant consistently testified that her co-workers treated her badly and made fun of her because of the dermatitis, not her carpal tunnel injury. It is significant that although appellant attributed the dermatitis with wearing an Ace bandage as a result of her carpal tunnel injury, the physicians who treated her skin condition consistently diagnosed her condition as an anxiety neurosis and referred her to a dermatologist. Another physician's note indicated that appellant's condition was self-induced. Although Dr. Moneypenny stated that in his opinion, appellant's psychological problems were causally connected to physical injuries that she sustained while working, the Commission had the authority to resolve conflicting medical evidence. The Commission's finding is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Robbins and Crabtree, JJ., agree.

1 The Commission made other findings of fact as well, including 1) that appellant failed to establish the existence of a permanent physical impairment with objective findings, 2) that appellant's left carpal tunnel problem had resolved, 3) that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to a permanent physical impairment as a result of her left carpal tunnel syndrome, 4) that appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her dermatitis is causally related to her employment, 5) that appellant failed to prove that her dermatitis was compensable, 6) that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered from left extremity complaints that were causally related to her employment, 7) that appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the elements necessary to establish a compensable mental injury, 8) that the preponderance of the evidence failed to establish that there were any unpaid medical expenses related to treatment provided to appellant for a compensable injury for which appellee was liable, 9) that appellant failed to prove that appellee controverted any medical benefits which appellee ultimately paid, and 10) that appellee controverted appellant's entitlement to compensation for a permanent physical impairment to the upper left extremity, the compensability of the claimant'scurrent left upper extremity problems, the compensability of the claimant's dermatitis, the compensability of the claimant's mental problems, and its liability for unpaid medical expenses. However, appellant limits her appeal to the issue of whether her mental injury arose out of a continuing physical problem.