NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE

DIVISION I

MARY DeWITT

APPELLANT

V.

CARNELL JOHNSON and PAMELA AKINS

APPELLEES

CA00-1240

June 13, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CIV-99-7759]

HONORABLE JOHN WARD, CIRCUIT JUDGE

DISMISSED

Mary DeWitt appeals the trial court's order finding that her attorney had authority to settle a civil matter pending before the same court. For reversal, appellant argues that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. Because we conclude that what is before us is not an appealable order, we dismiss.

On August 20, 1999, appellees filed an ejectment complaint against appellant, alleging that they had superior title to a certain parcel of real property located in Pulaski County. Appellant responded, denying each averment generally and pleading in the affirmative that she, in fact, had superior title.

The matter was scheduled for trial on June 12, 2000. On that day and prior to the trial, appellees made a "courthouse-step" offer to settle the matter for $5,500. Appellant's attorney contacted appellant and communicated the offer. Thereafter, based on appellantcounsel's conversation with appellant, he contacted opposing counsel and accepted the offer.

Subsequently, appellant made it known that she was unwilling to abide by the settlement agreement.

Accordingly, a hearing was held to determine the authority appellant's attorney had to accept appellees' settlement offer.1 At the hearing, both appellant and her attorney testified. The order embodying the trial court's decision stated in pertinent part:

On this 23^rd day of August, 2000, comes on a hearing to determine Defendant Counsel's authority to settle the above-captioned matter. The Court, having considered all testimony, evidence, and other matters brought before this Court, hereby orders and finds that Defendant's counsel . . . had authority to settle the case herein.

As our supreme court stated in Beverly Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc. v. Hillier, 341 Ark. 1, 3, 14 S.W.3d 487, 488 (2000) (citations omitted):

Ark. R. App. P.--Civil 2(a) (1999) permits the appeal of final judgments, decrees, or orders, which in effect discontinue the action or determine the action and prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. Significantly, the supreme court will not reach the merits of an appeal if the order appealed from is not final or does not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions. In fact, the rule that an order must be final to be appealable is a jurisdictional requirement, observed to avoid piecemeal litigation. We have held that for an order to be final and appealable, it must terminate the action, end the litigation, and conclude the parties rights to the matter in controversy.

Because the question of whether an order is appealable is jurisdictional, we are obligated to raise the issue sua sponte despite the fact that the issue appears uncontroverted between the parties. E.g., Sevenprop Associates v. Harrison, 295 Ark. 35, 37, 746 S.W.2d 51, 52 (1988).

Here, we conclude that the order from which the appellant appeals is not appealable. The order merely found that appellant's counsel had the authority to settle the case, but it did not order any party to do anything. More particularly, we conclude that the order did not discontinue the action or determine the action and prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. Furthermore, a fair review of the record does not reveal any order that would remotely suggest that the circuit case has been closed. Accordingly, we conclude that an objective interpretation of the record indicates that this matter is ongoing.

Dismissed.

NEAL and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.

1 Although there was no motion filed, the trial judge considered the hearing to be for a "motion for authority to settle . . . ."