ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

JIMMY GRIFFIN

APPELLANT

V.

TYSON FOODS, INC.

APPELLEE

CA00-01306

JUNE 6, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E801310]

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Jimmy Griffin, appeals from the order of the Workers' Compensation Commission that found that he had not sustained a compensable injury. He argues there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission's decision. We hold that the opinion contains a substantial basis for denial of relief and affirm.

Appellant began his employment with Tyson Foods, Inc. as a long haul truck driver on January 3, 1995. His claim for compensation arose out of an incident that occurred on Thursday, January 8, 1998, in Westfield, Massachusetts. Appellant described how he pulled his truck away from a loading dock, but was unable to shut the trailer's doors because of ice buildup. He climbed up into the trailer and used a hammer to break away the ice. He chipped the ice down far enough to shut the doors, but when he was getting down, he fell about five feet out of the back of his trailer. In falling from the trailer, Mr. Griffin struck the inner partof his right elbow on the truck and landed on his feet.

He immediately experienced pain in his right elbow, drove to the nearest payphone, and reported the incident to his dispatcher. The next day, his elbow was red and swollen twice its normal size. The employer sent him to a hospital where the attending physician restricted appellant from using elbow until the following Monday.

After spending the weekend in a motel, appellant reported back to the doctor on Monday who released him with no restrictions. Pursuant to his employer's instructions, Mr. Griffin began a long haul to Texas. During this haul, he noticed a burning in his arm that started in his neck and came down through his left shoulder. The employer instructed appellant to return to Arkansas where he began diagnostic procedures and treatment for an injury to his cervical spine.

There is no question on appeal that Mr. Griffin sustained a compensable injury to his right elbow. The issue is whether he sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine in the same incident.

When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979); Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Gourley, 50 Ark. App. 1, 899 S.W.2d 482 (1995). The weight and credibility of the evidence is exclusively within the province of the Commission. W.W.C. Bingo v. Zwierzynski, 53 Ark.

App. 288, 921 S.W.2d 954 (1996); Morrow v. Mulberry Lumber, 5 Ark. App. 260, 635 S.W.2d 283 (1982). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996); Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). Even if a preponderance of the evidence might indicate a contrary result, we will affirm if reasonable minds could reach the conclusion of the Commission. Hawkins Constr. v. Maxell, 52 Ark.App. 116, 915 S.W.2d 302 (1996); Henson v. Club Prods., 22 Ark. App. 136, 736 S.W.2d 290 (1987). The Commission is required to weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992); Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1992). The resolution of conflicting medical evidence is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission. Foxx v. Am. Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115, 924 S.W.2d 814 (1996); Brantley v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 48 Ark. App. 27, 888 S.W.2d 543 (1994).

The Commission adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that the greater weight of the medical evidence revealed that appellant's cervical and left upper extremity complaints were produced by degenerative osteoarthritic changes of the vertebrae in the affected area and that such bony abnormalities are the result of progressive osteoarthritic changes over time, rather than recent acute trauma. He noted that these bony abnormalities were present on various radiographic tests performed shortly after the incidentof January 8, 1998, and that the vertebra where the defect is located appeared to be exactly the same as those that produced identical cervical and left upper extremity difficulties in 1979, years prior to the 1998 incident.

In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ addressed the medical opinions of the treating neurosurgeon and the operating neurosurgeon. Both had completed a fill-in-the-blank form stating that each held the opinion that appellant's medical treatment and disability was related to the fall on January 8, 1998. One had added the following hand-written addendum: "I think is at least 51% or greater that his fall led to surgery, either by aggravation of cervical spondylosis or by rupturing disc at level of pre-existing spondylosis." (Emphasis in original). However, the ALJ found upon reviewing the medical records and notes that their medical opinions were based upon a material mistake of fact that the symptoms began contemporaneously with the incident of January 8, 1998. In analyzing their opinion testimony with the entire record, he found that appellant had failed to present sufficient credible evidence to establish the existence of a causal relationship between his cervical defect with its resulting symptomology and the employment related incident of January 8.

The ALJ considered and addressed the medical evidence and specifically discussed the opinion testimony appellant relies upon. The Commission is entitled to review the basis for a doctor's opinion in deciding the weight and credibility of the opinion and medical evidence. Maverick Transp. v. Buzzard, 69 Ark. App. 128, 132, 10 S.W.3d 467, 470 (2000).

We cannot say that the Commission's conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that his subsequent cervical condition was the result ofany injury that arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment on January 8, 1998, was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we affirm the Commission's decision.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Robbins, JJ., agree.