ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM

May 24, 2001

DAVID EARL GIPSON

Appellant

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Appellees

CR 00-1246

PRO SE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [CIRCUIT COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, FT. SMITH DISTRICT, NO. CR 95-118B, HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI, JUDGE]

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED

Appellant David Earl Gipson has lodged in this court an appeal from an order denying postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37. We denied appellant's motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in the appeal. Gipson v. State, CR 00-1246 (April 5, 2001). Appellant now asks that the motion for counsel be reconsidered on the ground that the appeal has merit which he lacks the skill to articulate and that the trial judge had a conflict of interest and should have recused from the Rule 37 proceeding. The exact nature of the alleged conflict is not explained, and appellant does not contend that there was request made below for the trial judge to recuse.

As we said when the motion for appointment of counsel was denied, postconviction matters are considered civil in nature with respect to the right to counsel, and there is no absolute right to appointment of counsel in civil matters. See Virgin v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 92, 702 S.W.2d 9 (1986). We have held, however, that if an appellant makes a substantial showing thathe is entitled to relief in a postconviction appeal and that he cannot proceed without counsel, we will appoint counsel. See Howard v. Lockhart, 300 Ark. 144, 777 S.W.2d 223 (1989). Appellant's entirely conclusory allegations that the appeal has merit and that the judge should have recused are not sufficient to establish that there was some issue raised in the Rule 37 proceeding which had substantial merit.

Motion for reconsideration denied.