ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

JOHNNY CARTER

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

APPELLEE

CA00-1142

May 23, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E808906, E809040]

AFFIRMED

The appellant in this workers' compensation case was employed as a maintenance worker by appellee. He filed a claim for benefits alleging that he sustained a compensable cervical injury on June 25, 1998, while working on air conditioning equipment located overhead. After a hearing, the Commission found that appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a compensable accidental injury because by his own testimony he could not identify any particular incident as the cause of his injury, and that he did not suffer a compensable gradual injury because he failed to show that his work activity was the major cause of his disability or need for treatment. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding that he failed to establish a compensable injury brought on by a specific incident, identifiable by time and place of occurrence. We affirm.

In reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 71 Ark. App. 207, 29 S.W.3d 751 (2000). The issue on appeal is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm the Commission's decision. Id. Where, as here, the Commission denies a claim because the claimant has failed to show entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if the Commission's opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Williams v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 267 Ark. 810, 590 S.W.2d 328 (Ark. App. 1979).

The Commission's denial of relief in the present case was based upon appellant's testimony that he could not say exactly when or where he injured himself other than noticing pain shortly after lunch, and that he could not identify any particular incident as the cause of his injury. This is substantial evidence to support a finding that he failed to prove an accidental injury under Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 342 Ark. 11, 16, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000), where Justice Glaze wrote:

In her second point, Hapney submits that her neck injury is compensable because the injury was caused by a specific incident and was identifiable by time and place of occurrence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9- 102(4)(A)(i). This argument is meritless and can easily be dismissed. Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) defines a compensable injury as one "caused by a specific incident and . . . identifiable by time and place of occurrence." Hapney's own deposition testimony reflected that she did not know how she was injured and that she did not recall anything specific happening, nor did Hapney tell her treating physician that her pain was associated with any particular, specific incident. Thus, her own words belie her argument that the injury was caused by a specific, identifiable incident.

Although there was evidence that appellant in the present case told his physician that he associated the pain with working overhead, such conflicts in the evidence were for the Commission to resolve. Tucker v. Roberts-McNutt, Inc., 342 Ark. 511, 29 S.W.3d 706 (2000). On this record, we cannot say that the Commission was required to find that there was, in fact, a specific incident when the appellant's own testimony indicates that there was not.

Appellant devotes one paragraph to the alternative argument that his neck injury was a compensable, gradual-onset one. However, in the absence of any contention that his injury was caused by rapid repetitive motion, suffice it to say that a gradual-onset injury to the neck is not compensable under our Workers' Compensation Act. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1999); Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., supra.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Roaf, J., agree.