ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

CHARLOTTE HARRIS

APPELLANT

V.

PT OF THE SW 1/4 OF THE SE 1/4 OF SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 11 WEST

APPELLEE

CA00-1094

May 23, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST DIVISION

[NO. QT98-4398]

HON. ALICE GRAY,

CHANCELLOR

AFFIRMED

This is an appeal from the dismissal of appellant's quiet title action based on appellant's refusal to make herself available for a telephone hearing.1 We affirm.

Initially we note that appellant, having conceded below that it was in the trial court's discretion to require her to attend a telephone hearing, may not argue to the contrary for the first time on appeal. It has long been the rule that questions that were conceded in the trial

court will not be decided on appeal. See, e.g., Gray v. Doyle, 167 Ark. 495, 269 S.W. 579 (1925).

Furthermore, we would find no error even were we to address appellant's argument on its merits. Appellant cites White v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet Co., 266 Ark. 942, 587 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. App. 1979), for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss for an invalid reason. We agree that this is the law, but we do not agree that the trial court's reason in the present case was improper.

Appellant demanded that the case be decided on the basis of affidavits and exhibits, and she refused to attend even a telephone hearing. This is similar to the situation in Screeton v. Crumpler, 273 Ark. 167, 617 S.W.2d 847 (1981). Screeton, a resident of Florida, refused to appear for depositions, hearings, or trial unless she was reimbursed for her lost time and travel expenses. The supreme court held that the trial judge was right to dismiss her case, noting that Scranton could have sought permission of the court to proceed in writing other than in person, but instead simply stood on her refusal to appear.

In the present case, appellant was not required to appear in person, but only to make herself available for a telephone hearing. Trial courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute it diligently, and the exercise of that authority will be reversed only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Gordon v. Wellman, 265 Ark. 914,582 S.W.2d 22 (1979). We cannot say that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in requiring appellant to attend a telephone hearing.2

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Roaf, J., agree.

1 Appellant asserts in her brief that she did not refuse to appear, but merely asked the court to grant her petition to quiet title based on her sworn statement and the evidence before it. That is incorrect. In a letter to the trial judge's law clerk (that appellant did not include in her abstract of the record), appellant conceded that it was within the court's discretion to require a hearing, and specifically requested that "[i]f the Court does not feel comfortable for any reason in issuing the decree, then enter an order denying the petition."

2 The trial judge filed with our Clerk an Order to Supplement Record, Supplemental Opinion, and Affidavit pertaining to this case on April 25, 2001. We note that this material was filed after the case was submitted to us for decision, and we have not considered it.