ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CHIEF JUDGE JOHN F. STROUD, JR.

DIVISION I

DELTON A. BILLINGS

APPELLANT

V.

PLUM CREEK LUMBER

APPELLEE

CA 00-1251

May 16, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION [E910817]

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellant, Delton Billings, appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission's adoption and affirmance of the administrative law judge's denial of workers' compensation benefits on the sole basis that he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a causal connection existed between his alleged injury and subsequent complications. We reverse and remand to the Commission.

On September 2, 1999, Billings was employed as a quad-saw operator at appellee's timber mill in Huttig, Arkansas. He asserted that he injured his back on that day when he attempted to manually lift with a cant hook an approximately 400-pound log that had fallen off the conveyor. Billings testified that he immediately reported his injury to his supervisor, and shortly thereafter, when the pain became too intense, he was taken by his supervisor to Dr. Greg Smart, the company doctor. After a short period of conservative treatment, Dr. Smart referred Billings to Dr. Wilbur Giles, who ultimately performed lower lumbar surgery on Billings on September 30, 1999.

An MRI taken September 7, 1999, indicated evidence of a small posterolateral herniated disc on the right, effacing the epidural fat plane and causing mild extrinsic pressure on the thecal sac at L4-5. At L5-S1, there was evidence of a posterocentral and leftward herniated disc, effacing the epidural fat plane and displacing the nerve root slightly to the left and also causing slight extrinsic pressure on the thecal sac with the disc extending slightly inferior to the disc space. This MRI was compared with a prior study made on June 19, 1995, and the physician, Dr. Diana Jucas, indicated that there was an increase in the size of the herniated disc at L5-S1 and that the small disc seen at L4-5 was not as well appreciated on the prior study.

In his opinion denying benefits to Billings, the ALJ, citing a full Commission opinion, stated, "Except in the most obvious cases, the existence of a causal relationship must be established by expert medical opinion." The ALJ found that the record failed to reflect any expert medical opinion establishing such a causal relationship. In affirming and adopting the ALJ's opinion, the Commission noted that this statement was inconsistent with our supreme court's holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Van Wagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). Nevertheless, without elaboration, the Commission determined that "this error is not grounds for reversal or remand." However, after specifically stating that the ALJ's sole basis for denying benefits was inconsistent with our supreme court's precedent, they offered no other basis for the decision to deny benefits. In Commissioner Coffman's concurringopinion, he stated that the case was more analogous to Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2000), and Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc., 63 Ark. App. 260, 977 S.W.2d 5 (1998), than Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, supra. However, he provided no reasoning as to why he believed this to be true.

The standard of review in workers' compensation cases is well-settled. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chemical v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). Where the Commission denies benefits because the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof, we will affirm the Commission's decision if it displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Tucker v. Roberts-McNutt, Inc., 342 Ark. 511, 29 S.W.3d 706 (2000). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Geo Specialty, supra.

The Commission has stated no rational basis for the denial of relief; therefore, this case must be reversed and remanded to the Commission. In this case, the sole basis for the denial of benefits is appellant's failure to offer medical evidence of a causal connection between his alleged injury and his employment. However, in Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997), this court held that "the requirement that a compensableinjury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings applies only to the existence and extent of the injury." Our supreme court adopted this view in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, supra, holding:

337 Ark. at 447, 990 S.W.2d at 524.

The most recent decision on this issue is Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2001). In that case, our supreme court harmonized the VanWagner decision with its decisions in Frances v. Gaylord Container, supra, and Crudup v. Regal Ware, supra. The supreme court differentiated Frances and Crudup from VanWagner holding that in those cases, the appellants chose to rely upon medical evidence to establish causation, but the medical evidence failed to meet the statutory requirement that medical opinions must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

In the present case, the differences between the 1999 MRI and the 1995 MRI indicate that something has occurred during the time period between the two tests. However, the Commission made no findings regarding whether the medical evidence did or did not meet the statutory requirements. Furthermore, our supreme court's decision in VanWagner heldthat in some cases, such a finding is not necessary for a successful claim. Because we have no findings from the Commission as to why the claim was denied, but rather only conclusory statements, we must reverse the denial of benefits and remand to the Commission for findings of fact.

The appellant also argues that he rebutted the presumption of marijuana use after marijuana metabolites were found in the urine sample he provided after the accident. However, this issue was never ruled upon by the Commission; therefore, we cannot address it. See W.W.C. Bingo v. Zwierzynski, 53 Ark. App. 288, 921 S.W.2d 954 (1996).

Reversed and remanded.

Hart and Crabtree, JJ., agree.