ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION III

RAILEY A. STEELE

APPELLANT

V.

PAMELA R. STEELE

APPELLEE

CA00-838

May 16, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

[NO. E-98-1815]

HON. JIM D. SPEARS,

CHANCELLOR

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

This is a divorce case involving issues relating to the division of marital property. The appellant contends that the chancellor erred in failing to grant his motion for reconsideration and in making an equal distribution of appellant's pension plan.

The appellant's motion for reconsideration involved two asserted errors in the decree. First, the chancellor ordered that each party should receive one-half the value of certain stock, but appellant asserts that his order is ambiguous because it did not specify whether the division should take place before or after appellant paid a $17,000 debt related to the stock. Second, the chancellor apparently erred in calculating appellant's child support obligation on the basis of his gross pay rather than his take-home pay.

Appellee concedes that this method of calculating child support is erroneous, and that the decree is ambiguous with regard to the manner in which one-half the value of the stock is to be determined. In light of these concessions, we reverse and remand for the chancellor to specify whether the determination of the parties' respective portions of the stock is to take place before or after the payment of the $17,000 debt, and to enter an order of child support taking into account the deductions enumerated in Section II of Administrative Order No. 10: Arkansas Child Support Guidelines, 331 Ark. 581 (1998).

Appellant also contends that the chancellor erred in dividing the portion of his pension accumulated during the marriage equally between the parties. He asserts that the chancellor should have considered that, while appellee is a 46-year-old certified public accountant in excellent health, he is 65-year-old state employee with an irregular heart beat, hypertension, and prostate trouble.

Arkansas Code Annotated 9-12-315 (1)(A) (Repl. 1998) requires that all marital property be distributed one-half to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable. If the court does find that an equal division would be inequitable, it should make an equitable division taking into consideration the length of the marriage; the age, health, and station in life of the parties; the occupation of the parties; the amount and sources of income; vocational skills; employability; the estate, liabilities, and needs of each party; and the opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income.

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the chancellor was required to find that an equal division of the marital interest in appellant's pension plan would be inequitable. We note that the marital interest in appellee's pension plan was also divided equally between the parties, that appellee has the responsibility of exercising physical custody of the parties' child, that appellant is not without other financial resources, and that, despite his health concerns, appellant remains employed in a position that requires extensive travel and states that he intends to do so until the day he dies. On this record, we cannot say that the chancellor clearly erred in failing to find that an equal division of this asset would be inequitable, and we affirm on this point. See McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Stroud, C.J., and Roaf, J., agree.