NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

OLLY NEAL, Judge

DIVISION IV

CA00-1161

MAY 9, 2001

BOYD FREEMAN

d/b/a FREEMAN INDUSTRIES

APPELLANT AN APPEAL FROM THE JOHNSON v. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CIV-99-63]

J.L. ROBERTS

d/b/a J.L. ROBERTS PLUMBING HONORABLE JOHN S.

AND HEATING, INC. PATTERSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE APPELLEE

REVERSED

Appellant, Boyd Freeman d/b/a Freeman Industries, Inc., brings this appeal from the trial court's denial of his objection to register a foreign judgment. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in registering the foreign judgment when the judgment was based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree and reverse.

The evidence adduced at trial is as follows: On May 27, 1999, the County Court of Rankin County, Mississippi entered a default judgment against appellant in a case styled "J.L. Roberts d/b/a J.L. Roberts Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Boyd Freeman d/b/a Freeman Industries, Case No. CIV-99-63." The default judgment ordered appellee,J.L. Roberts d/b/a J.L. Roberts Plumbing and Heating, Inc., to recover the total sum of $32,934.21 from appellant. Appellee subsequently petitioned the Johnson County Circuit Court for registration of the foreign judgment. Appellant filed an amended objection to the petition, arguing that "the separate Defendant Boyd Freeman never had any contract or working arrangement with [the appellee]," and that Boyd Freeman had been, at all times, "a citizen and resident of Johnson County, Arkansas." Boyd Freeman argued that appellee never obtained personal jurisdiction over him, individually, and that any judgment against him should be void for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant argued that Freeman Industries, Inc., was an Arkansas corporation authorized to conduct business in Arkansas and that Freeman Industries, Inc., a general contractor, did not have a contractual arrangement with appellee in Rankin County, Mississippi. Appellant further argued that Freeman Industries, Inc., was not named as a defendant in the Rankin County, Mississippi action and that "service upon the same has likewise never been obtained." Appellant argued that "any judgment allegedly rendered against the corporation is likewise void for lack of jurisdiction."

In an affidavit filed in support of his objection to the registration of the foreign judgment, Boyd Freeman stated he has never in his capacity as President of Freeman Industries, Inc. or in his individual capacity, had any connection with appellee in Rankin County, Mississippi. He stated that it was his understanding that Central Industries, a mechanical contractor, "contracted with J.L. Roberts Plumbing and Heating." Mr. Freeman stated that his office "was apparently served with the Summons and Complaintin this matter during a time frame when [he] was in a week and a half of jury trial in Sebastian County, Arkansas." He stated that he did not "become aware of the significance of the same until [he] received the Petition for registration of this foreign judgment." By its order filed June 23, 2000, the trial court denied appellant's objection and registered the foreign judgment.

The State of Arkansas must give full faith and credit to foreign judgments under Article 4, section 1, of the United States Constitution. Amant v. Callahan, 341 Ark. 857, 20 S.W.3d 896 (2000). Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, a foreign judgment is as conclusive on collateral attack as a domestic judgment would be, except for the defenses of fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction in the rendering court. Chemical Methods Leasco, Inc. v. Ellison, 46 Ark. App. 288, 879 S.W.2d 467 (1994) (emphasis added). Foreign judgments entered by default are equally protected against collateral attack, unless the previously stated defenses can be established. May v. May, 57 Ark. App. 215, 944 S.W.2d 550 (1997).

For state courts to maintain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident person under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party must satisfy two prongs: the party, first, must show that the nonresident has had sufficient minimum contacts with the state and, secondly, must show that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Williams Mach. & Fab., Inc. v. McKnight Plywood, 64 Ark. App. 287, 983 S.W.2d 453 (1998). It is essential for a finding of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident party that there be some act bywhich the defendant purposefully avails himself or herself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state. Id. Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant generally exists when the defendant's contacts with the state are continuous, systematic, and substantial. John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Although the default judgment listed "Boyd Freeman d/b/a Freeman Industries" as the named defendant, it is clear from the affidavit of Boyd Freeman that Freeman Industries, Inc., and Boyd Freeman, individually, never entered into any type of contract or had any connection with appellee in Rankin County, Mississippi. Because there was no hearing held on appellant's objection to the registration of the foreign judgment, the only evidence before the trial court to support the finding in its order was the suit involving Boyd Freeman d/b/a Freeman Industries. However, in the context of the lawsuit outlined in the default judgment, there was no evidence showing that Boyd Freeman or Freeman Industries, Inc., had sufficient contacts in Rankin County, Mississippi or that Boyd Freeman and Freeman Industries, Inc., availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in Rankin County, Mississippi. Because the record does not affirmatively show that Boyd Freeman or Freeman Industries, Inc., was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the County Court of Rankin County, Mississippi, we conclude that the trial court erred in permitting the registration of appellee's foreign judgment and this cause is reversed.

Reversed.

Hart and Baker, JJ., agree.