ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, JUDGE

DIVISION II

SHONEY'S, INC.

APPELLANT

V.

CAROL PORTER

APPELLEE

CA00-1106

May 9, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION [NO. E811695]

AFFIRMED

Shoney's, Inc. appeals a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that reversed the determination by the Administrative Law Judge that appellee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee had sustained a compensable injury and, accordingly, awarded benefits. For reversal, appellant argues that the full Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree with appellant and affirm.

Appellee began working for appellant as a prep cook on November 7, 1997. Eventually, she became the main cook and, thereafter, assistant kitchen manager, which required that she undertake some administrative duties along with her original duties as a prep cook. As a prep cook, appellee would prepare various foods, including fruits and vegetables, for customers.

In June, 1998, appellee's hand began hurting, and she developed numbness in both her fingers and hands and pain in her neck. She reported these problems to her supervisors and

sought treatment from Dr. Terry L. Clark, who referred her to Dr. William A. Knubley, a neurologist, who in turn referred her to Dr. Stephen A. Heim, an orthopaedic surgeon, who, upon review of appellee's electromyogram report, diagnosed her condition as carpal tunnel syndrome ("CTS"). In October, 1998, Dr. Heim operated on appellee's left wrist, and thereafter, appellee filed a claim, alleging that she suffered from bilateral CTS and an injury to her neck while employed by appellant and seeking compensation benefits for temporary total disability, medical treatment, and an attorney's fee.

The A.L.J., however, denied appellee's claim, reasoning that she had failed to prove that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Specifically, the A.L.J. concluded that appellee's testimony that she had problems with her wrists and hands before she began working for appellant prevented her from establishing that her work was the major cause of her injury. The full Commission on appeal, however, reversed and concluded that despite appellee's admission that she suffered from some pain, the greater weight of the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury was related to her work. From the full Commission's order, comes this appeal.

On review, we affirm if the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711(b)(4)(D) (Repl. 1996). A Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence if reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion. E.g., Spencer v. Stone Container Corp., 72 Ark. App. 450, 453, 38 S.W.3d 909, 911 (2001) (citations omitted).

Here, appellee filed a claim seeking compensation benefits for her CTS, which "isspecifically categorized as a compensable injury falling within . . . ." the definition of a compensable injury. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(a) (Supp. 1999). As such, a claimant does not have the burden of proving that her injury was caused by rapid repetitive motion to prevail on claim for a CTS injury. See Kidlow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 339, 969 S.W.2d 190, 192 (1998). Instead, the claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury that caused internal or external bodily harm requiring medical services, arose out of and in the course of her employment as established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, and was the major cause of her need for treatment. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii), 11-9-102(4)(D), 11-9-102(4)(E)(ii).

Moreover, if the claimant relies on medical opinions to establish causation, then those opinions "must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B). In other words, a claimant cannot rely on "opinions based on `could,' `may,' or `possibly' [because such terms] lack the definiteness required to meet claimant's burden to prove causation . . . ." Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 533, 20 S.W.3d 280, 284 (2000). However, as our supreme court recently stated in Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 303, ____ S.W.3d ____, ____ (2001):

In the case at bar, we conclude that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Although it is true that appellee testified that she had some hand and wrist pain prior to her employment with appellant, it is also true that she did not seek any medical attention for her hands and wrists until after she had provided appellant with hand-intensive labor for approximately seven months. Because determinations of the credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony are within the general province of the Commission, Min-Ark Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, 58 Ark. App. 309, 317, 950 S.W.2d 468, 472 (1997), we will not disturb its decision to believe appellee in this matter. Appellee also established by medical evidence supported by objective findings that she suffered from CTS. Moreover, Dr. Knubley opined that it was "very likely that some of these activities may aggravate [appellee's] underlying disorder," and Dr. Clark opined that "[i]t is my opinion that her [CTS] most likely is related to her type of employment." While these opinions are not stated in absolute terms, in our view these opinions are sufficient because they are expressed in terms that go beyond mere possibilities and establish that the work was the reasonable cause of the injury.

Accordingly, we conclude that there was substantial evidence for the Commission to conclude that appellee sustained a work-related injury that was the major cause of her need for treatment. We, therefore, affirm.

Affirmed.

NEAL and BAKER, JJ., agree.