ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CHIEF JUDGE JOHN F. STROUD, JR.

DIVISION III

CHARLES RAY WORTHEM

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 00-1021

May 2, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE FULTON

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR-98-27]

HONORABLE JOHN DAN KEMP,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Charles Worthem, was convicted by a Fulton County jury of committing rape by engaging in deviate sexual activity with another person who was less than fourteen years of age. He was sentenced to thirty years' incarceration at the Arkansas Department of Correction.

Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of rape; therefore, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. The State's evidence indicated that the victim, eleven years old at the time of the rape, was digitally penetrated by the appellant while on a bed.

Appellant's first point on appeal is that the trial court erred in not allowing him to question the victim's credibility, citing discrepancies between the victim's trial testimony and the information contained in the affidavit for the arrest warrant. Appellant alleges that he made "proper effort" to challenge the victim's credibility; however, the abstract does not reveal that any objections of this nature were made during the victim's testimony. To preserve an argument for appeal, there must be an objection in the trial court that is sufficient to apprise the court of the particular error alleged; the appellate court will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 6 S.W.3d 74 (1999). Because appellant did not make a specific objection with regard to the issue of which he now complains, his first point is not preserved for appellate review. Nevertheless, we note that the record reveals that appellant was allowed to question the victim and the officer who prepared the affidavit with regard to the discrepancies.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in not allowing him to cross-examine the victim on an issue raised by the prosecutor on direct examination. During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor asked the victim if she liked school, to which she replied in the affirmative. On cross-examination, appellant's counsel attempted to ask the victim if she remembered getting expelled from school. The State objected, arguing that the expulsion was a prior bad act that was not relevant to the victim's credibility. Appellant contended thatthe question did go to the victim's credibility. The trial court sustained the objection, and appellant now contends this ruling was in error.

In his argument, appellant contends that the prosecutor's question was meant to lead the jury to the belief that the victim liked school; that evidence that she had been suspended twice from school was contained in the victim's medical records that the State had provided to appellant; and that the restriction placed on his cross-examination amounted to a constitutional deprivation. These arguments were not raised below; therefore, we will not address them on appeal. See McDole v. State, supra.

Appellant also argues that the question by the prosecutor to the victim of whether she liked school opened the door for him to question her about her expulsions from school. A trial court is afforded considerable discretion on rulings regarding the scope of cross-examination, and the appellate court will not reverse such rulings absent an abuse of discretion. Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 862 S.W.2d 222 (1993). We agree with the State that the prosecutor's questioning of the victim as to whether she liked school did not open the door for appellant to question her about being expelled from school. This issue is governed by Rule 608(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence (2000), which provides:

Under this rule, questions regarding a specific instance of misconduct, other than the exception provided in the rule, which is not applicable in this case, must be clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994). In the present case, the fact that the victim had been suspended or expelled from school was not probative of her truthfulness or untruthfulness; therefore, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow appellant to question the victim on this issue.

While it is true that Rule 608(b) does not apply to impeachment by contradiction, Shaver v. State, 37 Ark. App. 124, 826 S.W.2d 300 (1992), we agree with the State that this line of questioning cannot be classified as such. The victim never testified that she had not been suspended from school; she only stated that she liked school. Because she had not denied being suspended, appellant's counsel could not question her about the suspensions under the auspices of impeachment by contradiction.

Appellant's last point on appeal concerns the refusal to admit medical records of the victim after she alleged that appellant had raped her. From the argument in his brief, it appears that appellant wanted the proffered records introduced for the fact that they contained the information that the victim had been suspended from school twice, thus attacking her credibility. This argument was not made below, and this court will not address arguments made for the first time on appeal. McDole v. State, supra. However, even if this argument had been preserved for appeal, the refusal to admit the records for this purpose wasnot an abuse of discretion for the same reasons previously stated in the discussion of appellant's second point on appeal.

Affirmed.

Pittman and Roaf, JJ., agree.