ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

HENRY CLYDE HAYNES

APPELLANT

V.

AMY CAMILLE HAYNES

APPELLEE

CA 00-1105

APRIL 25, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

[NO. E-1999-323]

HONORABLE DAVID LEE REYNOLDS, CHANCERY JUDGE

AFFIRMED

In this domestic case, the appellant, Henry Clyde Haynes, appeals the order of the Faulkner County Chancery Court, which found that the sum of $42,126.38 constituted a marital debt and that based upon the parties' divorce decree, appellant must reimburse the appellee, Amy Camille Haynes, for that amount. On appeal, appellant argues that the chancellor erred in finding that he must reimburse appellee for repayment of a loan on a promissory note that she signed. We find no error and affirm.

This court reviews chancery cases de novo on the record, and we will not reverse a finding of fact by the chancery court unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In reviewing a chancery court's findings, we give due deference to that court's superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Myrick v. Myrick, 339 Ark. 1, 2 S.W.3d 60

(1999).

On May 6, 1999, the Faulkner County Chancery Court granted appellant a divorce from appellee. The court incorporated a property settlement agreement, which was signed by the parties, with the court's order. The property settlement agreement stated that appellee was responsible for any indebtedness on a 1999 Chevrolet Tahoe and for appellee's casino debt. The agreement further stated that appellant was responsible for all other marital debt.

On July 30, 1999, appellee filed a motion for contempt against appellant in which she alleged that after the divorce decree was entered, she attempted to pay off her automobile debt and was informed by the lien holder that she could not without paying a debt of $42,126.38 for a line of credit. Appellee paid both the automobile debt and the line of credit. Appellant refused to reimburse appellee for the line of credit arguing that he did not sign the note and that the funds were not used for his benefit.

Upon stipulation of the parties, the chancellor reviewed only the pleadings in this case. We note that in her brief, appellee includes an attachment purporting to be a photocopy of a promissory note and disclosure. However, appellee failed to make this attachment part of the record below. An appeal is confined to the record, and we will not consider items outside of that record.

After reviewing the pleadings, the chancellor found that the $42,126.83 line of credit was a marital debt and ordered appellant to reimburse appellee for the full amount. In his order, the chancellor found that the $42,126.83 debt was a loan made by Regions Bank on February 5, 1999, as evidenced by the promissory note. The divorce complaint was filedApril 1, 1999, with the parties' separation beginning on March 28, 1999.

Appellant maintains that neither he nor the lower court considered the line of credit in determining that appellant would be responsible for the parties' marital debt. However, in appellant's answer to appellee's interrogatories, appellant confirmed that he was aware of the $42,126.83 debt at the time the divorce decree was entered. In fact, appellee asserted in her responses to discovery that appellant responded that he had spoken with Pat Murphy, a loan officer with Regions Bank, on several occasions "to get [the loan] pushed through faster."

Below, appellant essentially asked the chancellor to determine whether the line of credit was marital property contemplated by the property settlement agreement. The chancellor acknowledged that the property settlement agreement required appellant to pay all marital debt with the exception of appellee's casino debt and her automobile debt. The chancellor also noted that this provision in the settlement agreement was a primary consideration in appellee not taking one-half of the marital estate, which had a cash value in excess of $1,400,000. We have entertained questions about marital debts and whether they should be "considered" in assigning marital property as questions of fact, and we decline to reverse decisions about them unless they are clearly erroneous. Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996). A chancellor is to take into consideration the liabilities and needs of each party when dividing martial property. See id.

Although appellant claims on appeal that he had no knowledge of the existence of the debt at issue, appellant admits in the pleadings that he was aware of the debt before theparties divorced or even separated. Furthermore, appellee acknowledged that she participated in the acquisition of the loan by conversing the loan officer at the bank on several occasions. Based upon the pleadings presented to the chancellor, we cannot say that the chancery court's characterization of the $42,126.83 line-of-credit debt as martial debt was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we agree with the chancellor that appellant must reimburse appellee for this amount.

Affirmed.

Robbins and Vaught, JJ., agree.