ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN E. JENNINGS, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CA 00-1005

April 25, 2001

DANIEL KOVACH AN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

APPELLANT WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

E904401

VS.

FLYING SAUCER DRAUGHT EMPORIUM AFFIRMED

APPELLEE

Daniel Kovach contended he sustained a hernia while lifting a 200-pound beer keg at the Flying Saucer Draught Emporium on April 5, 1999. The law judge found appellant's injury compensable, but the Commission reversed finding that appellant had failed to satisfy three provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-523(a) (Repl. 1996). Specifically, the Commission held that appellant had failed to prove the following: that the occurrence of the hernia immediately followed as the result of sudden effort, severe strain, or the application of force directly to theabdominal wall; that he experienced severe pain in the hernial region; and that the pain caused him to cease work immediately. Appellant argues that the Commission's opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant testified that he had worked at the Flying Saucer for approximately one month and that his job duties included bussing tables and lifting and moving beer kegs. He stated that he was working the lunch shift and that his shift was almost over when he asked the manager whether he could leave early because business had slowed. Appellant stated that the manager asked him to move a beer keg before he left. He stated that, as he was moving the keg, he felt something in his lower stomach, similar to pulling a muscle. Appellant said that he went ahead and connected the spout to the keg and then went home. He stated that he noticed a large lump in his lower right pelvis that evening and that, when his manager called about the schedule, he let her know that he had possibly hurt himself. Appellant testified that he reported for work the next day and was told to see a doctor. He stated that Dr. David Hicks diagnosed him with a hernia and that Dr. Paul Osteen performed surgery on May 21, 2000. Appellant stated that before surgery the hernia was uncomfortable and that he could almost feel a pulse in it but that he never felt a sharp, direct pain. Appellant further explained that he stated in the accident reportthat it did not hurt because it was not an extreme pain. Finally, appellant conceded that he did not have a severe pain but had discomfort.

The Commission found that, although appellant testified that an injury took place on April 5, 1999, Dr. Hicks's medical records simply stated that appellant began having symptoms after starting his employment with appellee that included some heavy lifting. The Commission noted that appellant testified that his job routinely involved lifting beer kegs. The Commission found that there was no mention of any sudden effort or severe strain. The Commission placed greater weight on the medical records of when the injury occurred than on appellant's testimony because the Commission found that appellant was "confused" after he put on the WCC Form N that the "date of accident" was April 7, rather than April 5. The Commission found that appellant experienced hernia-related symptoms immediately after beginning employment with appellee, and not on a specific date. Next, the Commission found that appellant did not experience severe pain, and in fact, felt no pain at all. The Commission relied on appellant's own testimony where he denied experiencing severe pain and on Dr. Hicks's notes that appellant was asymptomatic on April 7. The Commission found that to consider that appellant had a high pain threshold would amount to specula tion since there was no evidence to that effect. Finally, theCommission found that appellant did not cease work immediately. The Commission pointed out that, after feeling a pull in his lower stomach while lifting the beer keg, appellant reconnected a spout on the keg and left work because his shift was over and not because of the pain.

In reviewing workers' compensation cases on appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Min-Ark Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, 58 Ark. App. 309, 950 S.W.2d 468 (1997). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Southern Steel & Wire v. Kahler, 54 Ark. App. 376, 927 S.W.2d 822 (1996).

Appellant argues that the Commission improperly added the word "immediately" to Dr. Hicks's medical report to make the finding that he began experiencing hernia-related symptoms immediately after beginning employment for appellee. Appellant contends that to rely on such altered medical history does not amount to substantial evidence. We disagree. The interpretation given to medical evidence by the Commission has the weight and force of a jury verdict. Geo Specialty Chem., Inc. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App.369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Without regard to the immediacy, Dr. Hicks's notes clearly state that appellant's "symptoms began after starting employment at Flying Saucer Draught Emporium." We cannot say that the Commission's decision on this point is not supported by substantial evidence.

Next, appellant argues that Dr. Hicks's medical reports indicate that there was a misunderstanding between appellant and his office and that Dr. Hicks later clarified that appellant was not "asymptomatic" and that he was in fact having symptoms but did not want pain medication. Appellant tried to explain that the pain he felt was not like the obvious pain one experiences with a broken ankle but was rather "an awkward lifting pain." Appellant indicated in his testimony that he wrote on the accident report that he was not hurt and unequivocally stated that he did not have severe pain in the hernia region following the strain. We cannot say that the Commission erred given such testimony.

Finally, appellant maintains that the Commission cited no evidence to find that the injury did not cause him to cease work immediately. Appellant contends that the last task that he was asked to do before his shift was over caused the injury, and he immediately left work after changing out the beer keg. Given appellant's testimony that he was not hurt after lifting the beer keg and that he even reconnected the spout before going home forthe day, we cannot say that the Commission was wrong in its finding that appellant left because his shift was over and not because of the pain.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.