ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JUDGE KAREN R. BAKER

DIVISION IV

SOTERRA, L.L.C.

A/K/A SOTERRA, INC.

APPELLANT

V.

STEPHEN ALBERT and

JOSEPH ALBERT, JR.

APPELLEES

CA00-776

APRIL 11, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

[NO. QT99-5379]

HONORABLE HOBSON VANN SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGE

REMANDED

The Pulaski County Chancery Court quieted title in appellees to certain unimproved and unenclosed lands and enjoined appellant from attempting to exercise any control or rights of ownership over the subject tract of land. We hold that the chancery court order does not describe the subject tract of land with sufficient specificity so that it can be identified solely by reference to the decree. Therefore, we remand the case and direct the chancellor to amend the decree and to provide a sufficient legal description to the subject tract of land.

This case involves a boundary-line dispute. Appellant is Soterra, L.L.C., a/k/a Soterra, Inc., a timber company that owns property in Pulaski County. Appellant has owned this property since 1946 and marks the boundaries of its property by painting a line on the trees along its property line. Appellees Stephen Albert and Joseph Albert, Jr., purchased property adjoining appellant's property on March 22, 1989. Highway 300 is near both parties' property and the area in dispute is a thirty-foot strip of land which lies on one end of appellees' property separating it from Highway 300.

It is appellees' position that, when they bought the property, they thought it extended all the way to Highway 300 but that, at some point thereafter, they discovered that appellant claimed ownership of the thirty-foot strip. Appellees approached appellant about acquiring an easement, but they never reached an agreement. Appellees hired Steve Parish to survey the property in 1992, and the resulting survey provided that appellees' property line fell in the middle of Highway 300 and included the thirty-foot strip. Appellant disagreed with the survey and said it changed the description of the property from that stated in the deeds and that the new description gave appellees 1.25 more acres than was included in appellees' deed. Appellees filed a quiet-title action on October 13, 1999, and after a trial, the chancery court issued an order on March 8, 2000, finding that the disputed land was wild and unimproved property and that Mr. Parish followed all General Land Office rules and regulations in surveying the property. The chancery court adopted the findings of Parish's survey and found that the property in question belongs to appellees. The court further found that appellant failed to prove that it was entitled to the land through adverse possession.

Appellant raises four issues for review, including: 1) whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in changing the description of the property purchased by appellees; 2)

whether the trial court erred in failing to find that appellant proved adverse possession while at the same time finding that appellees did prove adverse possession; 3) whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in making a finding that was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence presented by appellant; and 4) whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in misapplying the law cited in its order.

The supreme court has stated in a long line of cases that a chancery court's decree must describe the boundary line between disputing landowners with sufficient specificity that it may be identified solely by reference to the decree. Petrus v. Nature Conservancy, 330 Ark. 722, 957 S.W.2d 688 (1997). The permanent record in a boundary-line decision should describe the line with sufficient specificity that it may be identified solely by reference to the order. Id. In the instant case, paragraph 2 of the chancellor's order states that the property in question involves certain real estate and then gives a legal description. It is not indicated in the order whether that legal description describes appellant's property, appellees' property, or the thirty-foot strip that is in dispute, and it does not match the description from the new survey as set out in the record. Paragraph 3 of the chancellor's order states that appellees took title to their property by warranty deed filed in the Pulaski County Recorder's Office under instrument No. 89-1569. This appears to be a typographical error because there is no deed in the record under that number. Finally, the chancellor's order fails to include the new legal description that the trial court adopts in paragraph 7 of its order.

When a chancellor's decree does not describe real property in a quiet-title action with sufficient specificity so that it can be identified solely by reference to the decree, remandmay be required for the chancellor to amend the decree and provide the property's legal description. See Johnson v. Jones, 64 Ark. App. 20, 977 S.W.2d 903 (1998) (remanded holding prescriptive easement described as a line for which no width was given as legally insufficient); Jennings v. Burford, 60 Ark. App. 27, 958 S.W.2d 12 (1997) (remanded holding boundary description as "meandering fence line as identified by Askew survey" legally insufficient). An insufficient property description leaves the appellate court ill-equipped to decide the case upon the record before it and clarification is necessary to effect a decision. In this case, remand is a necessary, preliminary step before we may address the merits.

Remanded.

Hart and Neal, JJ., agree.