ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM

April 5, 2001

DAVID EARL GIPSON

Appellant

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Appellees

CR 00-1246

PRO SE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [CIRCUIT COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, FT. SMITH DISTRICT, NO. CR 95-118B, HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI, JUDGE]

MOTION DENIED

David Earl Gipson entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of theft of property and was placed on a five-year suspended imposition of sentence. In 1996, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence, and Gibson was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with two years suspended. The court of appeals affirmed. Gipson v. State, CACR 97-239 ( December 10, 1997). Gibson subsequently filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 challenging the judgment. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, and Gibson appealed to this court. Because the court had failed to enter findings of fact as required by Rule 37.3(c), we reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court. Gipson v. State, CR 98-911 (October 28, 1999). On remand, Rule 37 relief was again denied, and the record has been lodged here on appeal. Appellant Gibson now asks that counsel be appointed to represent him.

Postconviction matters are considered civil in nature with respect to the right to counsel, and there is no absolute right to appointment of counsel in civil matters. See Virgin v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 92, 702 S.W.2d 9 (1986). We have held, however, that if an appellant makes a substantial showing that he is entitled to relief in a postconviction appeal and that he cannot proceed without counsel, we will appoint counsel. See Howard v. Lockhart, 300 Ark. 144, 777 S.W.2d 223 (1989). Inasmuch as appellant states only that the "case should be reversed," he has failed to establish that there is substantial merit to the appeal; accordingly, the motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

Motion denied.