ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

BETTY SONGER

APPELLANT

V.

BLACK RIVER AREA DEVELOPMENT

APPELLEE

CA 00-918

APRIL 4, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPESATION COMMISSION

[NO. E 810399]

AFFIRMED

In this workers' compensation case, the appellant, Betty Songer, appeals the Commission's decision, which affirmed and adopted the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied appellant additional medical treatment and found that her healing period had ended. On appeal, appellant maintains that the Commission lacked substantial evidence to support its decision. We find no error and affirm.

The fifty-six-year-old appellant worked as a secretary for the appellee, Black River Area Development. On August 10, 1998, as appellant was unloading a large box of supplies, she fell with the box landing on top of her. Appellant injured her back and immediately sought emergency-room attention.

During the hearing before the ALJ, appellant testified that she was unable to sleep; she could not sit normally; she must sit in a hard chair; she has pain when driving a vehicle;and she has a permanent limp with pain radiating over her hip and leg. Appellant further testified that her pain starts in the middle of her back and goes down beside her tailbone, over her hip, and down to her knee. Appellant stated that she has been unable to work since the accident and that she regularly takes pain medication. Dr. Roland Hollis is appellant's treating physician. Appellant stated that Dr. Hollis recommended that she be evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon.

Employers must provide medical services that are reasonably necessary for treatment of compensable injuries. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 1996). Here, the parties stipulated that appellant sustained a compensable injury on August 10, 1998. Whether a medical procedure or device is reasonable and necessary treatment is a question of fact to be decided by the Commission. Arkansas Dep't of Correction v. Holybee, 46 Ark. App. 232, 878 S.W.2d 420 (1994).

In reviewing the Commission's decision on a question of fact, we will affirm the Commission if its decision is supported by substantial evidence; substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and is given its strongest probative value in favor of the Commission's decision. Branscum v. RNR Constr. Co., 60 Ark. App. 116, 959 S.W.2d 429 (1998). The question is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion from the one found by the Commission if

it were reviewing the case de novo, or even whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988). The Commission's decision should not be reversed unless it is clear that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusions if presented with the same facts. Johnson v. Democrat Printing and Lithograph, 57 Ark. App. 274, 944 S.W.2d 138 (1997).

After receiving emergency-room treatment, appellant sought care from several physicians. Dr. Anthony Russell, a neurosurgeon, treated appellant and ordered a lumbar myelogram to complete his diagnosis. The lumbar myelogram revealed no nerve root compromise or canal stenosis. A February 12, 1999 CT scan of the lumbar spine, post myelogram revealed a normal examination of the lumber spine with only mild annular bulges at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1 with no evidence of focal disc herniation or canal stenosis. On February 22, 1999, Dr. Russell opined that surgery was not warranted, and he further opined that her maximum medical improvement date was March 1, 1999. He released appellant to her pre-injury activities with no permanent impairment.

Appellant has pursued additional medical treatment with her family doctor, and she testified that she experiences continued pain. She seeks treatment from another specialist. While appellant may still have pain, the medical evidence presented indicates that a number of diagnostic tests have been pursued, medication has been provided, and physical therapy has been administered. Appellant's physicians have not recommended surgery. The Commission believed that appellant's condition did not warrant additional medical treatment. We do not believe that the Commission lacked substantial evidence to make sucha finding.

Next, appellant seeks temporary total disability benefits from March 1, 1999, to a date yet to be determined. Temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which a claimant suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. Stafford v. Arkmo Lumber Co., 54 Ark. App. 286, 925 S.W.2d 170 (1996). The healing period is that period for healing of an injury which continues until the claimant is as far restored as the permanent character of the injury will permit. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, 62 Ark. App. 162 , 969 S.W.2d 677 (1998). There is evidence in the record that supports the conclusion that appellee's healing period had ended. Again, we look to medical evidence from Dr. Russell, which indicates that appellant reached the end of her healing period on March 1, 1999.

We find no error in the Commission's decision which denied appellant additional medical treatment and found that appellant no longer remained within her healing period.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Baker, JJ., agree.