ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

KAREN R. BAKER, JUDGE

DIVISION II

MICHAEL D. CARR

APPELLANT

V.

FRANK FLETCHER COMPANIES, INC. AND FLETCHER AUTO GROUP

APPELLEES

CA97-1379

MARCH 28, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 1997-3824]

HONORABLE JOHN WARD,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant brought suit in Pulaski County alleging a breach of an employment contract. The trial court entered an order dismissing the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and awarded attorney's fees to appellees. Appellant brings this appeal challenging both the dismissal and the award of attorney fees. We affirm.

In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Van Dyke v. Glover, 326 Ark. 736, 934 S.W.2d 204 (1996). Appellant's complaint alleges the following: On October 17, 1996, the plaintiff was hired as the sales manager for appellees. Prior to being hired by appellees, he was the general manager of Trotter Lincoln Mercury in Pine Bluff, Arkansas for seven years. The compensation package offered by appellees and

accepted by appellant included a $60,000 yearly salary, health insurance, one week paid vacation (first year), use of a demonstration vehicle, and first year guaranteed bonus of $25,000. The contract entered into was capable of being performed within one year. Appellees fired appellant on February 11, 1997, without cause. Appellant relied to his detriment upon the compensation package offered by appellees by terminating his employment in Pine Bluff. Appellant requests damages be assessed against appellees based on a yearly salary of $60,000, first year vacation, health insurance for one year and the use of a demonstration vehicle.

We agree with the trial court that appellant's complaint fails to state facts upon which relief could be granted. The complaint does not allege that the term of employment was for a specific period of time. Without such an allegation, the employment agreement between the parties falls squarely within our employment-at-will doctrine.

The employment-at-will doctrine expressly recognizes the right of either party to terminate the employment at will even where the conditions of employment provide that an employee may not be discharged except for good cause. Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982). "The firm rule at common law is that either party can terminate at will, and while the rule has been criticized, ... we are unwilling to replace it with a rule that subjects the employer to suit for wrongful discharge whenever an employee is terminated." Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 136, 728 S.W.2d 501, 505 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Mertyris v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 310 Ark. 132, 832 S.W.2d 823 (1992). The doctrine applies unless the obligation is mutual and the employment is for aspecified period of time. If the employee does not agree to work a specified length of time, the employer is not obligated to employ him for any specified length of time. Likewise, if the employer does not agree to employ the employee for a specified length of time, the employee is free to leave at any time. We have created some limited exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Exceptions include where an employee is discharged "in violation of a well-established public policy of the state," Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (1988), and "where an employer's employment manual contains an express provision stating that the employee will only be dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the employee." Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 571, 810 S.W.2d 910, 913 (1991). However, no exceptions to the doctrine apply in this case. Thus, by operation of law, the appellee-employer had the right to discharge the appellant-employee at any time for any reason not contrary to public policy.

Appellant does not argue that any theory other than contract applies, nor does he allege that appellees failed to perform pursuant to the agreement up to the time of termination. Although the complaint does not allege that the employment was for a definite term, appellant argues on appeal that the provision for a $25,000 bonus and for health insurance implies that the employment agreement was for a term of one year. Nevertheless, the face of the complaint states that the contract of employment was capable of being performed within one year. The nature of this allegation necessitates the finding that no definite period of employment was identified.

Appellant also appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees pursuant to section 16-22-308 of Arkansas Code Annotated. A trial court is not required to award attorney's fees and, because of the trial judge's intimate acquaintance with the trial proceedings and the quality of service rendered by the prevailing party's counsel, we usually recognize the superior perspective of the trial judge in determining whether to award attorney's fees. Jones v. Abraham, 341 Ark. 66, 15 S.W.3d 310 (2000); Chrisco v. Sun Indus. Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). The decision to award attorney's fees and the amount to award are discretionary determinations that are reversed only if the appellant demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion. Nelson v. River Valley Bank & Trust, 334 Ark. 172, 971 S.W.2d 777 (1998); Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993). A grant of attorney's fees is an issue within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id. The appellee requested attorney fees of $5,000 and submitted billing records to support this request. The trial court agreed to wait until October 28, 1997, before ruling on this issue, so that appellant could respond to the fee request. After agreeing to wait, the judge sent a letter on the day of the hearing awarding fees in the amount of $3,500. Appellant argues that sending a letter ruling prior to October 28 was an abuse of discretion; however, the order granting attorney fees was not signed until October 30, 1997, and was not filed until November. The record does not reveal that appellant ever filed his response to the fee request. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of fees.

Affirmed.

Griffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree.