ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION II

UNION COUNTY, ARKANSAS

APPELLANT

V.

RICHARD GRIGSBY

APPELLEE

CA00-512

March 21, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CIV-97-443-2]

HON. DAVID F. GUTHRIE,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The appellee in this condemnation case was the owner of a 160-acre tract of timberland in Union County, Arkansas. The appellant, Union County, condemned approximately nine acres of appellee's land to build a highway, dividing the tract into two parcels of approximately seventy-five acres apiece. The County appraised the value of the condemned land at $11,525. Appellee filed an appeal to the Circuit Court of Union County, Arkansas. After a jury trial, a verdict was entered fixing the amount of appellee's recovery at $30,735. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellant Union County contends that the trial judge erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict and allowing the jury to consider speculative evidence presented by appellee, arguing that the appellee's expert witness offered no facts

upon which to base his opinion, and that the alleged damages to appellee's land were merely speculative in nature. We find no error, and we affirm.

When property is taken under the law of eminent domain, just compensation to the owner is measured by the difference in the value of the land, when put to its highest and best use, immediately prior to the taking and immediately after the taking. Rest Hills Memorial Park, Inc. v. Clayton Chapel Sewer Improvement Dist., 6 Ark. App. 180, 639 S.W.2d 519 (1982). The landowner is not required to confine his evidence to only the highest and best use to which the land is adapted, but may offer evidence of all purposes, comprehending its availability for any use for which it is plainly adapted as well as its most valuable purpose for which it can be used and will bring most in the market. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. DeLaughter, 250 Ark. 990, 468 S.W.2d 242 (1971). The latitude allowed the parties in bringing out collateral and cumulative facts to support value estimates made by witnesses is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Julian Martin, Inc., 16 Ark. App. 288, 701 S.W.2d 389 (1985).

A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Sparks Regional Medical Center v. Smith, 63 Ark. App. 131, 976 S.W.2d 396 (1998). In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, we view the testimony in the light most favorable to appellees and will indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Security Savings Ass'n, 19 Ark. App. 133, 718 S.W.2d 456 (1986). The credibility of witnesses is a matter to be determined by the jury, and jurors are accorded great latitude in considering testimony as to damages; theirverdict will not be set aside as excessive unless it is not supported by proof, or is so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice, or an incorrect appreciation of the law applicable to the case. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Julian Martin, Inc., supra.

There was no dispute that the highest and best use of appellee's land prior to the taking was for the growth of timber. The landowner's expert witness, Mr. Brian Hebert, was a registered and licensed forester who had extensive experience in buying and selling forest land in the area, and he gave his opinion regarding the value of the property condemned and the remainder before and after the severance. He testified, inter alia, that Union County has exceptionally good timberland, that the appellee's tract in particular is good timberland, that this land has been used for that purpose for generations, and that the surrounding land is used for timber, with the exception of a residential development that has failed and is reverting to timber production. He also testified that the division of the tract into two parcels by the new highway would diminish the value of the tract substantially in excess of the percentage of land actually taken, because this division would sever the existing network of forestry roads. Below and on appeal, the appellant argues that Mr. Hebert's testimony should have been stricken and a directed verdict entered in appellant's favor because appellant demonstrated that the forester had no factual basis for his opinions as to value. We do not agree.

First, appellant's argument lacks merit because a motion to strike the entire testimony of a witness should properly be denied where any part of that testimony is admissible. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Julian Martin, Inc., supra. Even if appellant werecorrect in asserting that the highest and best use of the property after the taking was for purposes other than timber production, appellee was entitled to introduce evidence of any use to which the property was plainly adapted. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. DeLaughter, supra.

Second, we do not agree that Mr. Hebert's testimony did not constitute substantial evidence of value merely because his expertise was in the field of forestry and he was not conversant with the value of the land for other purposes. The fact that one is not an expert pertaining to some use to which the property may be put goes only to the weight to be given to his testimony. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Ormond, 247 Ark. 867, 448 S.W.2d 354 (1969); see also Ft. Smith & Van Buren Dist. v. Scott, 103 Ark. 405, 147 S.W. 440 (1912). It is true that, in deciding the question of law whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must evaluate the opinions of the witnesses for appellees in relation to the bases upon which they are founded. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Bowman, 253 Ark. 890, 490 S.W.2d 112 (1973). In the present case, however, we think that Mr. Hebert's testimony was not based upon speculation or conjecture, but was instead founded squarely upon solid expertise regarding the value of the land for forestry purposes. Because there was substantial evidence at trial to support a finding that the highest and best use of the land after the taking was for such purposes, we cannot say that the trial judge was required to strike Mr. Hebert's testimony, or that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. See Ozark Gas Transmission System v. McCormick, 10 Ark. App. 210, 662 S.W.2d 210 (1984).

Affirmed.

Baker, J., agrees.

Roaf, J., concurs.

ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge, concurring. I concur in affirming this case. I agree that the trial court properly refused to strike the testimony of appellee's expert, even though the appellant, during its thorough cross-examination of the expert, Brian Hebert, elicited the following testimony: that Hebert used a sale of a ten-acre tract in part to arrive at a value for the 160-acre tract in this case; that he concluded the entire 150-acre tract remaining after condemnation of ten acres had been damaged to the extent of $100 per acre due to loss of logging-road access to only one-half of the tract; that new logging roads would need to be built for this one-half portion but that he had not calculated what the roads would cost; and that the $100-per-acre figure was merely his estimate.

It is well-settled that a qualified expert need only state his bare opinion on direct examination. Ark. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Cash, 267 Ark. 758, 590 S.W.2d 676 (1979); Ark. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Southern Development Corp., 250 Ark. 1016, 468 S.W.2d 102 (1971). However, the testimony of such a witness should be struck if it is shown to lack a sound and reasonable basis. Id. The supreme court has stated that where the testimony shows only a weak or questionable basis for the opinion of the expert, the issue becomes one of credibility for the fact finder rather than a question of law for the court. Ark. Hwy. Comm'n v. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 265 Ark. 417, 579 S.W.2d 587 (1979). Moreover, the court has stated that just because an expert witness uses a smaller tract in conjunctionwith an appraisal of a larger one, that does not, as a matter of law, show that the witness had no reasonable basis for his opinion regarding the fair market value of the property condemned. Ark. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Roetzel, 271 Ark. 278, 608 S.W.2d 38 (1980).

In short, even if appellant's cross-examination can be said to have revealed a weak or questionable basis for Hebert's opinion, it did not show that Hebert had no reasonable basis for his opinion, and the issue became one of credibility for the fact finder.