NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

RODNEY THOMPSON

APPELLANT

v.

BENNIGANS

APPELLEE

CA 00-1000

MARCH 21, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

[NO. E904352]

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Rodney Thompson appeals a Workers' Compensation Commission order finding that he failed to establish that he had sustained a compensable injury supported by objective findings as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996). On appeal, Thompson argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in concluding that he did not suffer a compensable injury. In the alternative, Thompson contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. Because we are unable to determine how the Commission reached its findings with respect to this issue, we are precluded from conducting meaningful appellate review of this decision. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case to the Commission for more detailed findings as to why it denied Thompson's claim for lack of a compensable injury.

The Commission found that Thompson was injured on Saturday, January 16, 1999, when he slipped and twisted his back after Jason Rivas, the Bennigans' kitchen manager, tossed him a pan in the kitchen. Thompson went to the emergency room twice, once the day following the incident and again on January 25, 1999. Medical reports from those visits indicated that Thompson reported being stiff in the morning, complained of lower back pain with tenderness, and had a decreased range of motion from pain. One week of light work was recommended on the last visit.

Thompson continued to work at Bennigans until February 14, 1999, when he worked a full shift. After that, Thompson said he was not able to continue working. Two months after his final work day at Bennigans, Thompson went to a chiropractor. The medical records from the chiropractic clinic indicate that Thompson reported his problems were a result of a work related injury and noted that Thompson had severe muscle spasms. Thompson was released for light duty on July 8, 1999, but he stated that Bennigans did not have an opening and told him he would have to fill out the application paperwork and start over again in the application process. Thompson did not fill out an application and began working at the Housing Authority on July 27, 1999.

Thompson testified that he had difficulty obtaining workers' compensation paperwork from Bennigans, and that he received the paperwork only after he told Bennigans that he had an attorney. Rivas, in a telephone deposition, acknowledged that Thompson asked for the workers' compensation paperwork in February or March and that it was not until May that he gave Thompson the information.

At the hearing before the ALJ, Thompson alleged that he suffered a compensable injury, claimed entitlement to medical benefits, and sought temporary total disability benefits from February 15, 1999 until April 14, 1999. The ALJ found that Thompson was a credible witness in his testimony about the accident, but that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence thathe sustained a compensable injury because he had failed to offer proof of the injury supported by objective medical findings. The Commission affirmed and adopted the findings of the ALJ. This appeal followed.

When the Commission denies compensation, it is required to make findings sufficient to justify that denial. Lowe v. Car Care Mktg., 53 Ark. App. 100, 919 S.W.2d 520 (1996). A satisfactory, sufficient finding of fact must contain all of the specific facts relevant to the contested issue or issues so that the reviewing court may determine whether the Commission has resolved these issues in conformity with the law. Id. The Commission must find as facts the basic component elements on which its conclusion is based. Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 309 Ark. 365, 830 S.W.2d 857 (1992). While the Commission may specifically adopt the findings of fact made by the administrative law judge, it is necessary under such circumstances that the administrative law judge have made sufficient findings. Lowe v. Car Care Mktg., supra.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9- 102(5) (Supp. 1999) provides in pertinent part:

(A) "Compensable injury" means:

(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body ... arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. An injury is "accidental" only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

To be compensable, an injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, which are defined as findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman, 66 Ark. App. 102, 989 S.W.2d 538 (1999). Thompson argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law because, in spite of finding that the accident occurred as Thompson testified, it concluded that he failed to prove an injury supported by objective evidence. The ALJ's findings, adopted by the Commission, stated that on "January 16, 1999, claimant did not sustained (sic) an injury which satisfied the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996)." In the "Conclusions" section, the ALJ concluded that "in the process of attempting to catch the pan, claimant twisted, slipped, and injured his back" and sustained a work-related injury. The ALJ noted Thompson's two emergency room visits, that he was released for light work duty for one week on January 25, 1999, and that there was no evidence in the record that Thompson "experienced residuals or incapacitation attributable to the January 16, 1999, accident." The ALJ further opined that, "[t]here is no evidence to reflect that the claimant was incapacitated from engaging in gainful employment between February 15, 1999, and April 14, 1999, when he obtained treatment at the chiropractic clinic." Though not explicitly stated, it can be inferred that the ALJ was addressing Thompson's claim for TTD by this finding.

Next, the ALJ discussed the requirements for establishing a compensable injury and noted that Thompson's ER medical records failed to "disclose the presence of objective medical findings as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) establishing the injury. As such, claimant has failed to establish the compensability of this claim." The ALJ further stated that the objective findings, muscle spasms, were noted "only" after Thompson was seen by physicians at the chiropractic clinic, and there was "no evidence in the record to reflect that he was incapacitated as a result of the January 16, 1999, accident such that he could have not returned to the work scheduled (sic) of respondent had he been placed on the same." He concluded:

While the evidence preponderates that an incident occurred on January 16, 1999, wherein the claimant twisted his back while discharging employment duties and required medical treatment, which was obtained the following day, January 17, 1999, and that the same is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, it is equally clear that the same does not satisfy the requirement of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) with respect to establishing a compensable injury. The claim is respectfully denied and dismissed.

The opinion clearly sets out the basis for the denial of TTD benefits. However, there is no further reference to or discussion of Thompson's muscle spasms with regard to Thompson's claimfor medical benefits. We cannot tell from the ALJ's conclusions and discussion, without making impermissible inferences, precisely why Thompson's claim for medical benefits was denied, and we do not review Commission decisions de novo. Consequently, we reverse and remand this case to the Commission to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why Thompson is not entitled to medical benefits and why his work-related injury is not a compensable injury.

Reversed and remanded.

Robbins and Bird, JJ., agree.