NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS ANDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge
DIVISION II
JAMES H. COLLINS & MARTHA L. COLLINS
APPELLANTS
v.
MELVIN D. JACKSON & MARTHA B. JACKSON
APPELLEES
CA00-652
FEBRUARY 21, 2001
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
E-98-76
HON. RUSSELL ROGERS, JUDGE
REBRIEFING ORDERED
In this one-brief case, James H. Collins and Martha L. Collins appeal from an order of the Arkansas County Chancery Court granting the petition filed by appellees Melvin D. and Martha B. Jackson seeking reformation of a deed that contained a defective legal description1 and denying the Collinses' counterclaim that asserted that they acquiredapproximately half an acre of adjacent land by adverse possession. On appeal, the Collinses argue that the chancellor erred in 1) failing to take into account the fact that the intent of the parties could be ascertained by the four corners of the deed and by extrinsic circumstances; 2) ignoring their claim of laches and estoppel; and 3) dismissing their adverse possession claim. Although the Collinses's arguments repeatedly reference the defective property descriptions contained in the deed that was reformed, they have failed to abstract the deeds. As such, we hold the abstract, as submitted, to be deficient. However, this case differs significantly from other cases in which the abstract was so flagrantly deficient that this Court would never have been able to reach the merits. Therefore, we decline to affirm based upon noncompliance with our abstracting rules, as we hold that doing so in this case would cause an unduly harsh result. Brinker v. Forest City Sch. Dist. No. 7, 342 Ark. 646, 29 S.W.3d 740 (2000); see Ark. S.Ct. R. 4-2(b)(6).
In this case, both appellant and appellees quoted identical language from the allegedly defective legal description contained in the deeds, so there was no question that the legal description was defective. Both sides agreed that it said what it said; ambiguity was never an issue. Therefore, as no dispute existed as to the language of the deed, thereby presenting no prejudice to the appellees, we decline to affirm the case for noncompliance with Rule 4-2(a)(6) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, as we consider that action to be unduly harsh in this case. Rule 4-2(b)(3) of our Rules states in part:
Whether or not the appellee has called attention to deficiencies in the appellant's abstract, the Court may treat the question when the case is submitted on its merits. If the court finds the abstract to be flagrantly deficient, or to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the disposition of the appeal, the judgment or decree may be affirmed for noncompliance with the Rule. If the Courtconsiders that action to be unduly harsh, the appellant's attorney may be allowed time to revise the brief, at his or her own expense, to conform to Rule 4-2(a)(6).
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-2(b)(3), we hereby allow appellant's attorney time to supplement his abstract, at his own expense, to conform to Rule 4- 2(a)(6).
We note as well that the Collinses' brief also failed to include the plats and surveys that were introduced into evidence at the hearing. Rule 4-2(a)(6) states in pertinent part:
Whenever a map, plat, photograph, or other similar exhibit, which cannot be abstracted in words, must be examined for a clear understanding of the testimony, the appellant shall reproduce the exhibit by photography or other process and attach it to the copies of the abstract filed in the Court and served upon the opposing counsel, unless this requirement is shown to be impracticable and is waived by the Court upon motion.
We therefore hold that these plats and surveys should be attached to the Collinses' abstract when they resubmit their brief.
Rebriefing ordered.
Pittman and Baker, JJ., agree.
1 We note that the order purporting to reform the deed contains a legal description that is identical to the allegedly defective description. If indeed this is a problem, we find that solution may be had pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.