ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM

FEBRUARY 15, 2001

LARRY LADWIG

Appellant

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Appellee

CR 00-594

PRO SE MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK TO FILE BELATED POINTS FOR REVERSAL [CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, NO. CR 95-658-2-3]

MOTION DENIED

In 1996, Larry Ladwig was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. We affirmed. Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark. 241, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997). Ladwig subsequently filed in the trial court a timely petition pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 37 seeking to vacate the judgment. The petition was denied, and the record on appeal from the order has been lodged here.

The attorney for appellant Ladwig has filed a brief and a motion to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and our Rule 4-3(j)(1), stating there is no merit to the appeal.1 Appellant was informed in accordance with Rule 4-3(j) he was entitled to

file within thirty days a pro se brief advancing any points for reversal he desired to raise on appeal. The points were due here Thursday, September 28, 2000, but not tendered by appellant until Monday, October 2, 2000. Now before us is appellant's pro se motion seeking leave to file the points belatedly.

This court does not grant extensions of time to file pro se points for reversal in "no merit" cases absent a showing that the thirty days allowed in the rule is not sufficient and that there is a specific point to be raised. Reed v. State, 278 Ark. 404 , 646 S.W.2d 6 (1983). While appellant has tendered specific points, he does not explain why the thirty days to file the points was insufficient except to allege that the prison mailroom is at fault for the late tender of the points.

We have declined, however, to consider an item to be tendered to this court at the moment it is placed in the prison mailbox. Hamel v. State, 338 Ark. 769, 1 S.W.3d 434 (1999). Appellant tendered the points four days after the thirty-day period had elapsed and has not stated good cause for the late tender. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Motion denied.

1 While Rule 4-3(j)(1) refers to the direct appeal of a judgment of conviction, we have applied the requirements of the rule to postconviction appeals. Matthews v. State, 332 Ark. 661, 966 S.W.2d 888 (1998); see Dewberry v. State, 341 Ark. 671, 15 S.W.3d 671 (2000); Riley v. State, 298 Ark. 292, 766 S.W.2d 292 (1989).